INTRODUCTION
'Security' as a concept would provide a serious challenge to Sherlock Holmes in terms of detecting any definite meaning, any core of truth within it. In terms of the international legal order, 'security' is not viewed as a legal principle but is seen as the 'primary' purpose of the principal inter-governmental organisation of the post-1945 legal and political order. 2 It is worth considering the relevant provisions of the UN Charter in greater detail because they contain within a tension between security and justice, by placing security (partly) within the framework of international law. Article 1 of the Charter declares that the purposes of the UN are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
1 Sherlock Holmes to Doctor Watson in A Conan-Doyle, The Sign of Four (London, Penguin, 1982) 51, emphasis in original. 2 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151 at 168 where the Court stated that 'the primary place ascribed to international peace and security is natural, since the fulfilment of the other purposes will be dependent upon the attainment of that basic condition'.
School moves the study of security away from the narrow confines of the Realist neoscientist 'rationally calculating the multiple security threats', towards a more democratic construction of security based on shared understandings found in organisations, governments, civil society and other non-state actors, including individuals.
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The Copenhagen School identifies those objects that are existentially threatened as 'referent objects'. 22 The referent object for security has 'traditionally been the state and, in a more hidden way, the nation'. This signifies that 'for a state, survival is about sovereignty, and for a nation, it is about identity'. However, following the constructivist approach, 'securitising actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object'. 23 For the Copenhagen School, the 'referent object' is traditionally the state, although with new security agendas developing all the time the object can be collective concepts, such as the environment or regions, such as Antarctica, and this is reflected in the UN Security Council's expansion of the concept of threat. 24 These ideas are very helpful in understanding the fact that security has expanded, although it remains largely state-centric, and that it is best viewed through a constructivist lens as being founded on inter-subjective understandings within legitimate fora, such as the UN Security Council, UN General Assembly, and regional organisations, such as the OAS, AU, EU, Arab League and ASEAN.
III. SECURITY COMMUNITIES AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AGREEMENTS
In 1957, Karl Deutsch, having considered various historical arrangements of states that had succeeded in removing conflict within their membership, defined a 'security community' as 'one in which there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way'. He went on to say that 'if the entire world were integrated as a security-community, wars would be automatically eliminated'. By integration, he did not mean amalgamation into one state, rather the attainment of a 'sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change'.
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'Whenever states become integrated to the point that they have a sense of community' there 21 ibid. 22 is 'assurance that they will settle their differences short of war'. 26 Community building is a product of 'shared understandings, transnational values and transaction flows' and, once established, a security community generates stable expectations of peaceful change.
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Although the UN collective security organisation has not approached Karl Deutsch's concept of a security community, evidenced by the continuation of regular and frequent conflicts in the post-1945 world order, it has helped humankind to achieve the basic condition of any security community -survival. 28 There is evidence that the UN emerged from the Second World War as a form of 'security community' in order to consolidate the hard won peace by continuing the alliance that had defeated Germany and Japan. Ian Brownlie considered that the prosecution of the Second World War by the Allies against the Axis powers went beyond collective defence and became a war of sanction, the purpose of which was to remove a danger to world peace by extirpating the source of aggression. another security community, either to the UN General Assembly or, arguably, to established and competent regional security organisations.
Having outlined security agendas and communities, this chapter now considers how the advent of new technologies has affected security and how the UN has responded to these developments by helping to shape a normative framework for regulating new technologies and for dealing with any emerging threats. At this stage, it should be reiterated that the response to new technologies should be a combination of normative development (by the General Assembly and other norm-making bodies within the UN) and executive action dealing with immediate existential threats. Although that executive action is not confined to responding to breaches of international law, the legitimacy of such action is enhanced if it does indeed amount to an enforcement of existing law.
IV. THE UN AS A SECURITY COMMUNITY ON NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Bearing in mind that a security community is not simply concerned with creating a normative framework within which to tackle disputes and threats, nonetheless it is surprising that, in general terms at least, the UN has struggled to produce a normative framework for new technologies. In other areas of international relations, UN soft law, in the form of declarations, has eventually led to UN hard law, in the form of binding treaties. This has happened in human rights law, environmental law and, to a more diffuse extent, arms control law, but we see little of this development as regards new technologies, for example on the issue of cyber security. It is not that the UN is unaware of the issue -in 1999, for instance, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon states to 'promote at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security'
and went on to invite states to inform the Secretary General on the advisability of 'developing international principles that would enhance the security of global information and telecommunications systems to help to combat information terrorism and criminality'. well as 'measures' that might be taken to strengthen information security. 42 Unfortunately, the Report did not develop the 'concepts' that might constitute a normative framework to shape the use of cyberspace. States' responses to the Assembly's request contain some discussion of relevant 'concepts'. The Australian government stated that 'existing international law provides a framework for protection from information security threats arising from a variety of actors', mentioning a range of existing international legal principles applicable to the use of cyberspace (sovereign equality, the prohibition on the use of force and international humanitarian law), but admitted that greater discussion among states was necessary to refine the scope of applicability of these principles to threats emanating from the cyber realm. 43 The United States stated that principles of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello were applicable, while the UK used the more modern terminology of the law governing the 41 ME O'Connell, 'Cyber Security without War', (2012) 'robotics' were all envisaged in the Report, but their potential negative impacts were not considered, although the positive ones in terms of disarmament verification were. 56 The
Assembly simply took note of the Report and vowed to give the matter on-going attention.
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The matter remains on the UN agenda, but normative development has not occurred.
In 2007, the Assembly adopted a resolution that expressed concern about the development of unilateral export control regimes emplaced to prevent the export of dual use goods and technologies, which tend to impede the economic and social development of developing countries, urging the development of multilateral 'non-discriminatory guidelines for That being said, transposing these pre-existing rules and principles to the new domain of cyberspace encounters certain difficulties and raises a number of important questions.
Some of these questions can be resolved through classic treaty interpretation in conjunction with a good measure of common sense, whereas others require a unanimous policy decision by the international legislator, the international community of states.
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Meltzer perhaps understates the problem here -while the rules regulating the use of force and conduct of warfare may be applicable to cyber operations, they fail to capture their essence and, therefore, a great deal of cyber threats are not caught by those frameworks since they neither constitute the use of armed force nor are used in wartime. Thus, while the cyber 
V. DRONES, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UN
With the odd exception, such as the regulation of outer space, international law tends to develop as a reaction to change. In this way it might be anticipated that new non-kinetic technologies that can be used to disable computer networks, or to carry mass covert surveillance of e-mail traffic, may take decades to bring within a clear legal framework, depending on how quickly states come to realise that it is in their mutual self-interest to effectively regulate cyber-space. It may, in any case, prove to be an impossible task as it raises the question of whether states can actually regulate something that has escaped the confines of sovereignty -it may simply be too late to put the genie back into the bottle. In this scenario, states will fall back on general principles of international law, such as the norm prohibiting intervention in a state's political or economic affairs, which will not prevent cyber operations but will enable selective condemnation in the General Assembly and, occasionally, executive responses to particular threats by the Security Council.
However, when it comes to new technologies that seem to provide straightforward improvement in military efficacy, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, it should be expected that existing international law will be adequate.
Indeed, this is quite commonly the argument made in the literature, given that drones are seen as mere 'platforms' for the launch of weapons such as missiles and not new weapons per se.
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Furthermore, drones are portrayed by their users and supporters as upholding the value of security rather than undermining it. 65 Nonetheless, the increasing use of drones does raise security concerns for a number of reasons. When they are used for surveillance they are potential threats to personal security and privacy. When used for targeting purposes they not only raise security concerns for civilians potentially caught in the blast (the problem of collateral losses), but they also seem to either extend the battlefield, thereby bringing the Political Rights, 73 it is clear that states must take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect individuals within their jurisdiction who are subject to known threats to their lives. 74 The European Court of Human Rights has similar jurisprudence, stating in one judgment that a government that 'knew or ought to have known … of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party', must take 'measures within the scope of their powers, which, judged reasonably, might' be 'expected to avoid that risk'. 75 As has been stated in reviewing this jurisprudence:
Applying this jurisprudence by analogy to terrorist attacks creates some challenges: the bombing of civilians on aircraft or commuter trains and the hijacking of aircraft suggests a random choice of victims, rather than the selection of an 'identified individual or individuals' as victims. 76 become more complex. While human rights obligations apply to individuals within a state's territory, there is considerable debate about when they apply to individuals outside its territory but, arguably, within its jurisdiction. When considering the use of armed force from a drone against a terrorists suspect, the question is whether the individual is within the jurisdiction of the state using force. Although there is some Inter-American case-law that supports the application of the right to life in these circumstances, 77 there is contrary European jurisprudence. 78 Rather than considering whether the state using force has enough control over the targeted individual for the purposes of evaluating whether there is an assertion of jurisdiction in these circumstances, it would be better for the Courts to focus on the fact that the operator of the drone, often a distance away from the target, is clearly under the control of the state using force. 79 If jurisdiction is established, such uses of targeted force from drones, when taken outside of armed conflict, are violations of the right to life as there is usually no imminent threat to the state to justify its use of force as a last resort. 80 Indeed, the use of lethal force from drones seems to be an extreme and, paradoxical as it may sound, unlawful version of law enforcement where it is easier to kill suspects than to capture them (particularly as capturing suspects would put them clearly within the capturing state's jurisdiction). 81 Furthermore, the use of drones for targeting suspected terrorists appears to be an attempt to externalise a state's security measures to counter terrorism by taking out targets in another state's territory before they have chance to hit the drone state's territory or nationals.
The US has tried to justify this by arguing what is the ultimate justification for using lethal force -that there is a global armed conflict against terrorists or, at the very least, a transnational armed conflict against Al Qaeda and its associates. This argument is an attempt to justify a lower standard for when lethal force can be used as, in simple terms, a use of lethal force is allowed in an armed conflict if the target is either a military objective, a combatant, or a civilian who is directly participating in hostilities, and the anticipated military advantage. 82 The US has interpreted these rules liberally: to carry out 'signature' strikes on the basis that the targeted individual is performing suspicious activities; to target funerals where there is a concentration of Taliban leaders; to target drug lords (who are criminals not combatants); and sometimes to order strikes outside of a conflict-zone, for example, in Yemen in 2002 and again in 2011. 83 It seems that after the devastating attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, governments (and not just the US) have re-assessed their security priorities, have reasserted national security (often on the basis that this is the best way to protect human security) and have acted in violation of basic norms governing when coercion can be used by the state against individuals to protect the majority of its citizens. This has either been as a result of the extension of the battlefield or the extension of law enforcement. While the majority of states may support this, or, more accurately, remain supine in the face of these erosions, the securitisation of post-9/11 life has meant that (the right to) security has been elevated to a pre-eminent position in political rhetoric and action in contradistinction to its position as one of a number of human rights and protections provided by international law. 84 Thus, while there are international norms applicable to drone use, a great deal of it is underdeveloped, indeterminate or ineffectual. The UN itself has not tackled drone usage in any meaningful way. Although this is probably to be expected in the executive body, it is disappointing to see that the plenary body has also failed to fulfil its functions as a security community with the ability to shape normative frameworks, confining itself instead to exhortation in general resolutions to the effect that counter-terrorism efforts by states should be undertaken in conformity with international human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. 85 
VI. CONCLUSION
The UN system has confronted the issue of new technologies since the late 1980s, but has made limited progress on either consolidating applicable law or developing new laws and mechanisms. The fact that new technologies bring in aspects of many areas of policy and law -arms control, human rights, conflict, peace and security -means that specific frameworks need to be shaped by the UN Security Council, General Assembly, Secretary-General and other UN bodies. The uncertainty as to how to accommodate different security agendas within the framework of international law produces its own insecurity, so that we are caught in what appears to be a spiralling security dilemma in which one state's uncensored increase in security measures leads another state to increase theirs to a point where they feel more secure, which, in turn, leads the first state to further increase their security preparation.
Clarification of the applicable law and law-making can, of course, take place outside the UN, but as such it will be uneven, piecemeal and will lack the universality and legitimacy that the UN brings. The ever-growing use of cyber measures and drones are just two examples of how technology is outstripping law. We make not be able to determine the truth as to the legal meaning of 'security' in a logical Holmesian manner, but we should be able to achieve agreement on what it means in the case of new technologies.
